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This is the first report I have presented since the Service changed its name to the

Parking and Traffic Appeals Service. This reflects the fact that the Parking Adjudicators

also decide appeals against decriminalised bus lane as well as parking penalties. There

is also the prospect of further decriminalisation in a London Local Authorities Bill

presently before Parliament; and it is intended that appeals relating to the congestion

charging scheme, due to be implemented next year, will be dealt with at the Service’s

hearing centre, although by a separate corps of Adjudicators. The new name accurately

Although congestion charging appeals will be decided by separate Adjudicators, there

will no doubt be a need for, and benefits to be derived from, co-operation and liaison

between the two tribunals operating in such closely related fields. The Adjudicators look

In last year’s report I referred to the important Report of the Review of Tribunals under

Sir Andrew Leggatt, which had been published just as our report was being completed.

Sir Andrew’s Report presented a bold vision for the future of tribunals, founded on the

establishment of a unified Tribunals Service under the Lord Chancellor’s Department to

recommendations, primarily aimed at meeting the central goal of focussing on improving

The Lord Chancellor’s Department moved promptly to take the Report forward by issuing

summer of 2001. In March this year, the Department reported that the consultation

process had found pressure for reform of tribunal services: in particular, a need to

develop wider geographical and multi-channel access to tribunal services; to raise the

standards of timeliness and administrative service; to provide clarity on rights,

representation, procedures and decisions; and to promote greater confidence in the

independence of tribunals to deliver a fair outcome. The Department concluded that a

unified Tribunals Service, federal in nature, offers the best prospect of delivering

substantive change and improved service to users. It believes that this would help all

tribunals to deliver a service to appellants which is manifestly independent; realise

economies of scale; deliver a uniformly high standard of service; provide effective

feedback to policy makers and decision takers in government; and allow tribunals to

The intention is to take this scheme forward in stages over time, first bringing a number

of the busiest tribunals into the unified Tribunals Service. Because the sponsorship and

funding of local government tribunals raise issues peculiar to that sector and therefore

merit separate treatment, it is proposed that they be subject to a separate review in the

longer term. There is therefore no immediate prospect of PATAS being brought within

proposals. As we said in response to the Consultation Paper, we had reservations about

the creation of a unified Tribunals Service. We were concerned that such a body would

be unwieldy and would result in a centralist, insufficiently flexible approach. It is in our

view important not to lose sight of the fact that one of the advantages of tribunals is that

jurisdiction. Our operation, for example, has been specifically designed to be appropriate

to appeals relating to decriminalised traffic enforcement; and we believe it is this

bespoke approach that has enabled this tribunal to be recognised as a pioneer in the

provision of an efficient and user-focussed service. We therefore welcome the intention

that the Tribunals Service should be federal in nature. We believe this approach offers

the prospect of a model that will enable the benefits of a unified service to be achieved

whilst preserving a sufficient degree of autonomy for individual tribunals to manage their

Tribunals Conference 2001 for Presidents and Heads of Tribunals, which I was pleased

to attend. Rosie Winterton MP, Parliamentary Secretary at The Lord Chancellor’s

Report by, amongst others, Sir Andrew. I am sure that the conference will have made a

The other topic discussed at the conference was a draft Framework of Standards for

Tribunals prepared by the Council. The aim of this framework is to set down for the

benefit of all tribunals under the Council’s supervision the issues the Council is

concerned with in its statutory role to keep under review the constitution and working of

tribunals. It is intended to serve as a tool both for the Council in carrying out its role and

impartiality; accessibility to, and a focus on the needs of, tribunal users; that tribunals

should be properly resourced and organised; and that they should offer cost effective

procedures. I believe that this Service measures up very well against the principles and

the details of the framework. Nevertheless, there is a continuing need to review our

operation against the framework and consider whether any changes should be made as

A second important initiative this year has been the Development by the Judicial Studies

of this framework is to set down the core competences required by all tribunal members

irrespective of the jurisdiction in which they sit. The framework would provide common

standards to be applied across tribunals. The competences focus on and are grouped

under five key areas: law and procedure, equal treatment, communication, conduct of

hearing, and evidence. Their practical application would be in providing the foundation

for training programmes and mentoring and appraisal schemes. The draft framework

was considered in January at a Seminar attended by heads of tribunals, including

myself, and representatives of the Lord Chancellor’s Department and the Council on

What these two initiatives by the Council on Tribunals and the Judicial Studies Board

coherence across the tribunal world. Whilst neither initiative derives from the Leggatt

I also attended a Judicial Studies Board seminar on Liaison Between Tribunals and the

Administrative Court. It is this Court that hears proceedings for the judicial review of

Adjudicators’ decisions. There is no appeal as such from an Adjudicator’s decision and

judicial review is the remedy available to appellants or Local Authorities to challenge

such decisions in the Courts. The seminar was attended by representatives of the Court

of Appeal, the Administrative Court and Heads of Tribunals. It identified a number of

practical proposals for improvement. Applications for the judicial review of Adjudicators’

decisions are rare, particularly when measured against our substantial caseload; since

the inception of the Service in 1993, only three cases have proceeded to trial. Even so,

the remedy remains an important part of the totality of the judicial process. Indeed, one

such case, Westminster v The Parking Adjudicator, forms the main focus of our Report

Closer to home, this has been a year in which considerable attention has been focussed

on technical developments. In July 2001, New PAS, the long-awaited new computerised

adjudication system to replace the original computerised system that had been in use

since the inception of the Service, was introduced. This offers a number of new features,

including fully integrated word-processing, and the ability more easily to incorporate new

applications, its implementation was not entirely trouble-free. A number of bugs came to

light and the system was initially prone to crash with unacceptable frequency. Nor, from

the Adjudicator’s point of view, did the word-processing feature offer the expected

functionality. These difficulties inevitably had a detrimental effect on the day-to-day work

of the Adjudicators. However, the defects have now largely been remedied, although not

as quickly as we would have wished, and the system is now in the main functioning

satisfactorily, although problems do still occur from time to time. There are also a

Even so, we do not lose sight of the fact that our computerised adjudication process

offers substantial advantages over a paper-based system in terms of both adjudication

and overall case management. I would note at this point that bus lane appeals are

currently still dealt with through paper files. These appeals still form a relatively small –

about 4% - but growing part of our caseload. It would be beneficial for them to be

handled through the computerised process and we are pleased that this is in train.

The Invest to Save project, under which the Committee received a grant from central

government’s Invest to Save budget to pilot three technological initiatives, was launched

during the year. The first of the pilots allowed appellants to conduct a personal appeal by

Wandsworth Town Hall rather than making the journey to the hearing centre in central

London. The pilot was a resounding success; the feedback from the appellants was

universally positive and the Adjudicators who took part were enthusiastic. We are

pleased that this pilot was awarded a Commendation under the Innovation category at

the British Parking Awards in February. We are also pleased that the Committee has set

up a Working Group to examine how this facility might be established as a permanent

The other pilots, online submission of appeals and online payment of penalties, are

being run in 2002-2003. I am pleased that as part of this project our new website, at

number of new features, including access to key decisions, which can be viewed online.

The Adjudicators very much support the Committee in these initiatives to improve

completed their induction training in March. They were recruited to meet our increasing

workload and to fill the shortfall in resource arising from some Adjudicators reducing

their sitting hours with us as a result of taking on other commitments, including other

judicial appointments. This recruitment exercise has had the desired effect of reducing

the queue of postal cases and, at the time of writing, to continue it on a downward path. I

believe that this now offers the prospect of our being in a position to meet our aim of

The recruitment of the new Adjudicators provided the opportunity for us to revise

thoroughly our induction training. I am very grateful to those Adjudicators who put in a

great deal of time and effort in assisting with this task, and in presenting the final

package to the recruits. I am pleased to say it was well received. I believe it will have

We also held three training sessions for all Adjudicators dealing with a range of current

issues. These included such important subjects as the Leggatt Report, the proposed

revision of the Traffic Signs Regulations and General Directions, the Frameworks of

presentation from Transport for London on the operation of their camera enforcement of

bus lanes. In addition, as in other years, several Adjudicators attended the Judicial

Studies Board Tribunal Skills Development Course. A number of others participated in

parking attendant shadowing to give them an insight into parking enforcement at the

coalface; and others visited Transport for London to view the bus lane enforcement

Transport for London for arranging these visits. All the Adjudicators also undertook

The Adjudicators wish to express their appreciation of the efficient and ever cheerful

support of the Head of the Parking and Traffic Appeals Service, Charlotte Axelson, and

Last year we focussed in particular on bus lane appeals. Although still a relatively small

proportion of our work, it has been given impetus by the commencement of enforcement

by Transport for London on its road network from April 2001. Indeed, Transport for

London cases now account for about a third of all bus lane appeals. We remarked last

year that the legislation governing decriminalised enforcement is less than ideal and

drew attention to the fact that, unlike the parking enforcement regime, it did not provide

for liability to be contested on the ground that the penalty claimed by the Local Authority

exceeds the relevant amount. Whilst this defect has been remedied by the decision in

Kundra v Newham, it is still desirable that the legislation should provide this ground

expressly. The other glaring omission is that the legislation does not provide for hire

companies to pass liability on to the hirer. We are aware that at the time of writing steps

are in train to replace the existing legislation with regulations made under section 144 of

the Transport Act 2000. We hope that these regulations will remedy the defects in the

existing legislation and be based on the application of a common set of principles for

By far the most important decision this year was that in Westminster v The Parking

Adjudicator, a judicial review in the High Court of the Adjudicator’s decision in Woolfson

v Westminster. The case dealt with important issues concerning the powers of the

Adjudicator and the duties of the Local Authorities. We believe these issues are critical

to the fair operation of decriminalised traffic enforcement and to the public’s confidence

in it. Our consideration of the implications of the decision is the primary subject of this

In addition, we draw attention to concerns we have about aspects of the procedures

followed by Local Authorities. And, finally, we include comments on a number of the

Cases decided this year referred to in the report are set out more fully in the Digest of

In Westminster v The Parking Adjudicator, Westminster brought proceedings in the High

Court for judicial review of the Adjudicator’s decision in Woolfson v Westminster. The

grounds on which an appellant may appeal to an Adjudicator in parking cases are set

out in the Road Traffic Act 1991. In Woolfson the Adjudicator had to consider the ground

‘that the penalty charge exceeded the amount applicable in the circumstances of the

case’. He found that Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the right to

a fair trial, required that this ground had to be interpreted to empower the Adjudicator to

consider what was the appropriate amount of the penalty in any particular case and to

therefore direct that a penalty less than the fixed penalty, or no penalty at all, should be

This decision was overturned in judicial review proceedings brought by Westminster in

Article 6 is concerned with procedural fairness, not with the substantive law. Since the

amount of the penalty charge is set as a fixed penalty by the substantive law, Article 6

was irrelevant. On the proper interpretation of the Road Traffic Act 1991, the Parking

Adjudicator does not have power to take extenuating circumstances into account when

Whilst this decision clarifies the limitations of the powers of the Adjudicators under the

ground of appeal in question, His Lordship also addressed the important issue of the role

of the Local Authorities in considering extenuating circumstances. He made it clear that

particular extenuating circumstances, it would be widely considered to be harsh for the

penalty to be imposed. He confirmed in his judgment that the enforcement of penalties

by the Local Authority is not obligatory; it has a discretion whether or not to enforce a

Department of Transport’s ‘Guidance on Decriminalised Parking Enforcement Outside

London’ (1995) says that ‘local authorities should consider [cases where extenuating

circumstances are put forward] on their merits. In order to ensure consistency of

treatment local authorities should establish their own guidelines for dealing with such

cases, balancing the need to show flexibility in dealing with exceptional cases against

the need to enforce parking controls firmly in the wider public interest.’ His Lordship

referred to similar observations in The Government Office for London’s ‘Traffic

Management and Parking Guidance for London’ (February 1998). He said that in this

context it is well established that the purpose of traffic management orders is traffic

It is therefore now clear from this case that the discretion to alleviate the rigidity of the

entrusted solely to the Local Authorities. It is also implicit in Mr Justice Elias’ judgment

that he placed reliance on the Local Authorities’ exercising the discretion in accordance

with the central government guidance and having regard to the principle that the

overriding purpose of traffic controls is traffic management, not revenue raising. An

authority’s decision in such a case could no doubt be challenged by judicial review, but

In our view it is therefore vital that, in order to maintain respect for and confidence in the

enforcement process, Local Authorities must ensure that they exercise their discretion

fairly, objectively and, as the central government guidance says, flexibly, and be seen to

do so. It is also desirable that in order to achieve consistency of treatment across

London, Local Authorities should seek to agree common guidelines for the consideration

We do of course recognise the need, identified in the government guidance, for parking

controls to be firmly enforced in the public interest. Even so, we do have concerns that

not all Local Authorities fully understand the nature of their discretion to waive penalties

in appropriate circumstances or that all of them approach the exercise of the discretion

contravention. Because the anomaly in the bus lane legislation meant the hire company

could not pass liability to the hirer, the Local Authority pursued enforcement against the

hire company. The Local Authority apparently saw no difficulty in doing so even though

the hirer of the vehicle was the Local Authority itself and it was therefore the Local

Authority that had committed the contravention. When the case came to appeal, the

Adjudicator sought representations from the Local Authority on the propriety of a public

authority seeking a penalty from an innocent third party where the authority, through its

own wrongdoing, had created the liability to the penalty; and on what traffic enforcement

control benefit would be derived by the imposition of the penalty. The Local Authority

then decided not to contest the appeal. It is, however, remarkable that the matter got as

far as it did without, apparently, the propriety of the authority pursuing enforcement

In another case, the appellant had parked on a yellow line to accompany the victim of a

street attack, whom he had picked up, into a police station. The Local Authority declined

Cases that raise particular concern are those where a succession of Penalty Charge

Notices has been issued to a vehicle in relation to what is effectively a single incident in

circumstances where the motorist was unable to take action to nip the situation in the

bud. A typical example is that of a resident who goes on holiday for a number of weeks

leaving their car parked in a residents’ bay but, because of an oversight, not properly

displaying their resident’s permit. They return from holiday to find a large number of

In such a case, the total of the penalty charges will amount to a considerable sum, often

running into four figures. The issue that arises is whether it is appropriate for the Local

Authority to enforce payment of the total amount of the penalties. There are a number of

factors that need to be taken into account in forming a considered view. In this example,

if the motorist had been at home, they would have been alerted to their error by the

issue of the first Penalty Charge Notice and had the opportunity to forestall the issue of

the later ones. Being away, they have not had this opportunity. Their absence may also

well mean that for many of the Penalty Charge Notices the fourteen-day period for

paying at the reduced rate has passed. Although the failure to display is a contravention,

the motorist nevertheless is the holder of a permit entitling them to park. And there is the

general question of whether the total penalty is proportionate. This may raise issues

Some authorities do address these issues in multiple ticket cases and consider the

exercise of their discretion. Others, however, simply take the position that the individual

Penalty Charge Notices were properly issued and therefore will be enforced. But the

question is not whether the parking attendant was entitled to issue the individual tickets;

it is the broader one of whether it is appropriate for the Local Authority to pursue

However, for authorities to be able properly to exercise their discretion, motorists must

be aware of the discretion. Unless they are, they are not in a position to make a fully

informed decision whether to pay the penalty or make representations. In our view, the

Notice to Owner, as well as setting out the grounds on which legal liability may be

challenged, should also explain the discretion. We are not aware that at present any

Notices to Owner do so. Indeed, some appear positively to discourage representations

on mitigation by including something along the lines of: ‘excuses such as …. will not be

accepted’. We recommend that all Local Authorities should revise their Notice to Owner

In Woolfson v Westminster, the appellant also called into question the exemptions for

Authorities Traffic Orders (Exemption for Disabled Persons) (England) Regulations 2000

compel local authorities to provide to vehicles displaying a Blue Badge substantial

Kensington and Chelsea and part of Camden, are excepted from this requirement. In

each of these areas other, more limited schemes apply. Mr Woolfson contended that this

exception was in breach of his right to respect for his private life under article 8 of the

Convention. The Adjudicator rejected the appellant’s argument and found in the Local

Authority’s favour on this point. The appellant did not contest this aspect of the decision

Whilst the Adjudicator did uphold the legality of the exception, we do know that there is

considerable concern that the exception causes difficulty and confusion, particularly as

the four excepted authorities operate different exemption schemes for disabled persons.

We do, therefore, very much welcome the fact that there are, we understand, moves

afoot to review the exception to see whether the arrangements might be simplified. But

we do, of course, appreciate that the authorities have to take into account the overall

traffic situation and the competing demands of all road users for parking against a

We have become concerned that a number of instances of defects in Local Authorities’

procedures have come to our attention. These seem to have related particularly to bus

systems have been used for bus lane enforcement without being adequately adapted for

that purpose. This resulted, for example, in the case of one Local Authority’s

Enforcement Notice showing the date of the alleged contravention as being the date of

the Penalty Charge Notice when in fact the latter is invariably served by post later.

We also noted an apparent reluctance on the part of at least one Local Authority to allow

the motorist to view the video recording made of the incident concerned. We found this

surprising and we are pleased that, as we understand it, this has now been remedied. it

is a particular advantage of bus lane appeals that such video evidence is available as it

tends to minimise the scope for disputes on the facts. As we have said, the Penalty

Charge Notice is not served until some time after the incident and motorists frequently

evidence it is in everyone’s interests that they should be able to do so sooner rather than

later. This is likely to lead to more cases being cleared up earlier rather than proceeding

All Local Authorities, we believe, offer to provide stills from the recording although

usually at a cost. We would encourage Local Authorities to provide these free of charge.

This is in the interests of early resolution and if the case proceeds to appeal the Local

Authority will anyway have to provide them free to the appellant. Nor in those cases

where the appellant has good grounds for contesting liability is it easy to see why they

should have had to pay for the stills. For example, cases occur where the stills show that

the vehicle concerned was not the appellant’s but was, to use the vernacular, a ‘ringer’:

a similar vehicle fraudulently carrying the same registration number. Why should the

Early resolution, of course, saves time and cost and is as much in the interests of the

Local Authority as the motorist. It is not uncommon for appellants to withdraw their

appeal once they see the stills sent to them with the Authority’s evidence. We therefore

believe it is clear that early resolution would be encouraged if the Local Authorities as a

matter of routine sent copies of the stills with the Penalty Charge Notice, and we would

But procedural problems are not confined to bus lanes. In a number of appeals, it has

emerged that documents presented by the Local Authority in evidence as being a true

copy of the original have not been accurate copies. We do not believe this has been

anything other than administrative error. It is, however, still a serious matter since the

Adjudicators rely on the integrity of the evidence presented to them on which to make

their decisions; and it goes without saying that where evidence is presented by a public

authority, they should be able to rely on its integrity without question. We would impress

upon all Local Authorities that they must ensure that their procedures from start to finish

Authorities in fulfilling the statutory duty to consider the representations made in

response to the Notice to Owner or Enforcement Notice. This has been thrown into

sharp focus by the well-publicised events that occurred at the Borough of Richmond

Following concerns expressed by the Council about the writing off of a number of

Penalty Charge Notices, officers considered how to deal with the large volume of

correspondence to be handled by its Parking Enforcement Section. The decision was

taken that representations would be automatically rejected without the correspondence

being considered, relying on the right of appeal to an Adjudicator as the means by which

motorists with a meritorious case could obtain redress. Concerns expressed by staff

about this procedure led to an investigation by the Borough’s Monitoring Officer. The

Monitoring Officer concluded, rightly in our view, that in acting in this way the Council

was in breach of its statutory duty. In addition, the Notice of Rejection sent to the

motorist said, contrary to the true position, that the rejection was being made ‘after full

consideration of the representations’. The report recognised that it was likely that

payment had been made in some cases when it was not due. The upshot was that the

What makes this situation of particular concern is that it was not merely a matter of poor

handling by individual case officers; it was a corporate decision not to carry out a clear

statutory duty placed on the Council. We hope that all Local Authorities will take the

Whilst on the subject of representations we would mention one other point. It is common

for motorists to write to Local Authorities soon after they have been issued with a

Penalty Charge Notice on the street, querying their liability. Since these letters are not

representations made in response to the Notice to Owner issued later and therefore do

not form part of the formal legal process for contesting liability prescribed by legislation,

they are commonly referred to as ‘informal representations’. There seems to be some

uncertainty among Local Authorities about the status of these. Some decline to deal with

them, saying that they will only respond to formal representations. Indeed, some appear

to believe that because they are not part of the formal process they are debarred from

responding to them. The latter view is undoubtedly misconceived; there is nothing

prohibiting reply. We would suggest that it is good administrative practice to do so. We

know that many Local Authorities do reply. Indeed, where informal representations are

received within the 14-day period during which payment of the reduced penalty is

allowed, some offer a further 14 days from the reply for payment at the reduced rate.

This is a practice of which we heartily approve and it is one the Committee has in the

Different aspects of the timeliness of the Local Authority’s actions came into question in

two cases, Elliott v Brent and Watts v Westminster. The first concerned the time for

service of the Notice of Rejection, the second the time taken to release a vehicle from a

Elliott was an application of the principles enunciated in Davis v Kensington & Chelsea

in exercising its functions under the Road Traffic Act 1991 a Local Authority has

that duty includes an obligation to take steps to enforce a parking penalty within a

after the expiry of that period it is still open to an authority to show that the delay

The Adjudicator in Elliott found that the time taken to issue the Notice of Rejection, over

Watts concerned the duty of a Local Authority under section 69(4) of the Road Traffic

Act 1991 to release a vehicle from a clamp ‘on payment’ of the penalty charge and

release charges. The crucial question was the meaning of ‘on’ in the context. The Local

Authority argued, in substance, that it was not subject to any time constraints. The

Adjudicator, not surprisingly, rejected this argument and found that the Council was

under a duty to act promptly to declamp once payment is made. In the particular case,

the authority had taken over 4 hours to release the vehicle. The Adjudicator noted that

within which a declamp should be effected. She found that any time in excess of two

hours would prima facie be unreasonable. She accordingly directed the Local Authority

As well as being central to the Woolfson case, the impact of the Human Rights Act 1998

has arisen in other appeals. A point that appellants make from time to time is that the

fourteen-day time limit for payment of the reduced penalty acts as a disincentive to

appeal because if the motorist decides to contest the penalty by appealing he loses the

opportunity to pay the lower penalty. In Schwartz v Camden the appellant took this point

and argued that it constituted a breach of the right to a fair trial under article 6 of the

European Convention on Human Rights. The Adjudicator said that since the scheme is

prescribed by primary legislation he could not make a declaration of incompatibility with

the Convention; this was a matter for the High Court. However, he expressed the view

Convention as there is a clear public interest in providing an incentive for the prompt

In that case the Adjudicator also considered the meaning of ‘waiting’ and ‘parking’,

finding that they are synonymous. The appellant had argued that ‘waiting’ meant to

remain parked for a short time, and that ‘parking’ applied to longer periods.

This issue has arisen in a number of cases where appellants contested liability on the

ground that they were not the owner of the vehicle when the contravention occurred. A

number of Penalty Charge Notices are issued to a vehicle, sometimes all by the one

Local Authority, sometimes not. An Adjudicator makes a decision in relation to one

Penalty Charge Notice that the registered keeper ceased to be the owner on a particular

date. Despite this decision, Local Authorities pursue enforcement of other Penalty

example of such a case. As the Adjudicator said in that case, whilst the decision of one

Adjudicator is not binding on others, it will be regarded by them as highly persuasive and

to be followed in the absence of compelling reasons for doing otherwise. To operate in

any other way would create a climate of continual uncertainty and, in ownership cases, a

The Adjudicator in White v Westminster (see Footway Parking below) also regarded the

Local Authorities should bear this principle in mind when considering cases where there

Indeed, Adjudicators have in some cases taken the view that where a Local Authority

resisted an appeal in the face of a previous decision by an Adjudicator, this amounted to

wholly unreasonable conduct warranting an order for costs under regulation 12 of The

Every year a good number of appeals turn on whether the restrictions in place have

been lawfully signed by road markings and signs. If not, the restrictions cannot be

enforced. Two such cases of particular interest are included in the Cases Digest.

Genko & Shannahan v Croydon, which concerned the signing of a bus lane, raised a

number of issues of general importance. In particular, the Adjudicator considered the

effect of the authorisation of signs by the Secretary of State. Under section 64 of the

Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984, signs must either be those prescribed by regulations

(currently the Traffic Signs Regulations and General Directions 1994) or specifically

authorised by the Secretary of State. The Adjudicator said that authorisation by the

Secretary of State did not of itself render the signage adequate; its adequacy could still

be considered by the Adjudicator. The Adjudicator also said that the adequacy of

signage must be considered in context, and that where the traffic arrangements are

complex, special care must be taken to ensure the necessary information is conveyed to

These themes were echoed in Fox and others v Islington, a series of consolidated

appeals concerning the restrictions in place to control traffic around Arsenal’s football

ground, Highbury, when a football match or other event was taking place there. The

Adjudicator described the restrictions in force under a number of Traffic Management

Orders as ‘an extraordinarily complex set of regulations for such a small area’, with

different restrictions applying to different streets, different parts of streets and different

vehicles at different times, with many of them coming and going depending on Arsenal’s

fixture list. He said that ‘in considering whether each restriction is clearly and correctly

indicated to the motoring public……the context should be taken into account. A plate

that may give perfectly clear information taken on its own may cease to be so clear if it is

surrounded by others giving confusing information.’ It should also be noted that he found

that regulation 18 of the Local Authorities’ Traffic Orders (Procedure) (England and

Wales) Regulations 1996 does not give the Local Authorities an unrestricted discretion in

signing requirements. It does not override the requirements of sections 64 and 65 of the

Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 and is subject to the duty to act fairly. The Adjudicator

also made the obvious, but not always honoured, point that as well as being of a lawful

In Fox, the Adjudicator also had to consider the validity of the Traffic Management

Orders in force. Of course, the first condition that must be satisfied to enable the

enforcement of parking controls is the creation of restrictions by a valid Order. In this

case, because of the particular traffic conditions at which the restrictions were aimed, the

Orders provided that they were to apply in one case on match days and in another on

event days ‘from two hours before the advertised starting time of an event until normal

traffic operation can be resumed’. He said that the latter Order was fundamentally

defective because the restriction was not clearly defined. Although it might just be

ascertainable event (the advertised starting time) the termination of the period was

Clearly, it is important for Traffic Management Orders to be drafted so as to provide

certainty as to the restrictions in force. Any that do not are likely to be unenforceable.

We continue to see a good number of cases where the Penalty Charge Notice has been

issued for parking on the footway. We dealt last year with the common misconception

that pavement lights, set in the footway above a basement room to allow ingress of light,

are ‘private’ and therefore not part of the public footway. This misunderstanding appears

to be so widespread, particularly amongst motorcyclists, as to have acquired the status

of folklore. It does seem that the position may have been to some extent confused and

exacerbated because some Local Authorities that have in the past not been in the habit

of rigorously penalising such contraventions are now taking a stricter approach.

White v Westminster contains an extensive explanation of the law. However, the simple

point is that it should not be assumed that pavement lights are outside the public

footway. Indeed, we would go so far as to say that, whilst each case turns on its own

facts, where pavement lights are not separated from a physical barrier, it is more likely

than not that they are within the footway. In parking on pavement lights in such a

situation, the road user is therefore running a risk of being issued with a Penalty Charge

Notice. A good deal of difficulty and resentment would be avoided if road users would

To achieve consistency of treatment across London, Local Authorities should seek to

All Local Authorities should revise their Notice to Owner to explain their discretion

Local Authorities consider as a matter of routine sending copies of the video stills

period, all Local Authorities should offer a further 14 days from the reply for payment

The Appellant did not deny the contravention. The basis of his appeal was that he had

paid the reduced penalty within the 14 days allowed. The Adjudicator found as a fact that

The Adjudicator considered the grounds of appeal available to the Appellant under the

London Local Authorities Act 1996 (as amended), in particular the ground that ‘There

was no breach of an order or regulations of the type described in subsection (2) of the

said section 4’ - that is, a denial of a breach of a Traffic Management Order or

This ground had to be considered in the light of Mr Kundra’s situation. He tendered

payment of the penalty in time and yet a demand was made for a higher amount. It

would be most odd if Parliament had intended there to be no ground of appeal which

protected an appellant who had made a payment of a penalty but was being penalised

for an additional payment or was the subject of an enforcement process which was not

in accordance with statute. This appeared to be a breach of an appellant’s right to the

possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by

law, (Article 1 to the First Protocol of the European Convention on Human Rights). No

public interest was served by depriving an appellant of a right of appeal in such

The Adjudicator said he was mindful of his duty, under section 3(1) of the Human Rights

Act 1998, to read the relevant statute in order to give effect to it in a manner compatible

He also considered existing legal principles to which public bodies, including local

Kensington & Chelsea (PATAS Case No. 1970198981). In considering the nature of the

overarching duty upon enforcement authorities to act fairly at every procedural stage. In

that case the adjudicator decided that a duty of fairness included a burden upon the

Council act fairly by complying with specific time limits and specific procedures expressly

In R v Secretary of State for Home Department ex p. Doody (1994) (House of Lords)

Lord Mustill stated: ‘ Where an Act of Parliament confers an administrative power there

In addition, a body charged with the enforcement of financial penalties must do so with

‘clean hands’. In the case of Hull v London Borough of Croydon (PAS CR20/0086) the

adjudicator stated: ‘ An Authority cannot rely upon its own unlawful act –and, if it seeks

to do so, it is well-established that an inferior tribunal (such as Traffic Adjudicators are)

can, and indeed must, refuse to allow them to do so. It is a defence to enforcement

Accordingly, the appeal ground referred to above should be understood as meaning that

there is no breach of an Order or Regulation capable of lawful enforcement either at the

date alleged by the Penalty Charge Notice or any subsequent date in the enforcement

and appeal processes. If a penalty has been properly paid there is no enforceable

Mr Woolfson appealed in respect of a number of Penalty Charge Notices issued to his

The case raised two main issues. The first was this. Mr Woolfson is disabled and holds

a disabled person’s Blue Badge. The Local Authorities Traffic Orders (Exemption for

Disabled Persons) (England) Regulations 2000 compel Local Authorities to provide to

However, Westminster, as well as the City of London, Kensington and Chelsea and part

of Camden, is excepted from this requirement. In each of these areas other, more limited

general scheme was in breach of his right to respect for his private life under article 8 of

the European Convention on Human Rights, and discriminatory under article 14 of the

Niemitz v Germany [1992] ECHR 9214/80 in which the Court said that ‘Respect for

private life must also comprise to a certain degree the right to establish and develop

relationships with other human beings.’ He argued that in order to establish and develop

such relationships, he needed to gain access to premises in Westminster for social or

business purposes; that the only effective way that he could do so in the light of his

disabilities was by using his car; and that therefore the right under Article 8 extended in

his case to the right to drive and park his car close enough to walk to his destination, and

The Adjudicator found that the effect of Mr Woolfson’s disabilities made it impracticable

for him to use the Underground or buses and therefore he had to rely on personal

transport for travelling around London. However, the Convention gave no right as such

to drive or park a motor vehicle. There was no bar to Mr Woolfson travelling into and

about central London by personal motor transport, since he could make use of taxis,

minicabs and the Taxicard scheme. Mr Woolfson had not satisfied him that the cost and

inconvenience was such that he was in effect compelled to use his own car. Accordingly

he had not shown a breach of Article 8. Consequently, there could be no breach of

Article 14 since it did not give rise to any independent substantive rights, but required

that no person should be discriminated against in their enjoyment of the rights and

Accordingly, the challenge to the validity of the exemption of Westminster from the

The second issue concerned the powers of the Adjudicator to determine the amount of

the penalty that should be paid in any particular case where a contravention has

occurred. One of the grounds on which an appeal may be made is ‘that the penalty

charge exceeded the amount applicable in the circumstances of the case’. Mr Woolfson

that Article 6 of the Convention, the right to a fair trial, would be breached if a

tribunal, on finding that a contravention had occurred, could not exercise discretion

that the Human Rights Act requires the Road Traffic Act 1991 (RTA) to be read so

that the power in the RTA for the Adjudicator to ‘ give the London authority such

directions as he considers appropriate’ enabled it to be read in such a manner; and

that the Adjudicator could therefore take mitigating circumstances into account in

The Adjudicator accepted these contentions and found that he did have the power to

Woolfson held a genuine belief that the 1998 Act would support him in his claim to be

able to park as he did in the individual circumstances of each occasion, and that he did

circumstances Mr Woolfson should not be liable to pay the penalty charges incurred

The Queen on the Application of the Lord Mayor and The Citizens of Westminster v The

Adjudicator’s decision in Woolfson on the second issue. Mr Justice Elias said that Article

6 is concerned with procedural fairness, not with the substantive law. Since the amount

irrelevant. Therefore, the only question was the proper interpretation of the ground of

appeal ‘that the penalty charge exceeded the amount applicable in the circumstances of

the case’ without any Convention considerations coming into play. He said that phrase

naturally referred to the penalty defined by law as the appropriate penalty in the

circumstances. It presupposed an identifiable penalty that actually applied and was

capable of precise identification. The Adjudicator’s interpretation was inconsistent with

the notion of fixed penalties. Therefore, he declared the Parking Adjudicator did not have

payable for a parking contravention and did not have discretion as to the amount of the

penalty to be imposed. The Adjudicator had no power to issue the directions he did and

The Appellant made representations on 20th October 2000 and the Notice of Rejection

was dated 26th April 2001. The Local Authority said that it had responded to the

Appellant's representations within the statutory 6-month time limit. The Adjudicator said

that Section 7 of the London Local Authorities Act 2000 [which sets the time limit for

service of the Notice to Owner] did not apply to the Notice of Rejection. In exercising its

functions under the provisions of the Road Traffic Act 1991 the Local Authority had a

duty to act fairly: R v Secretary of State for Home Department ex p. Doody; Davis v

unreasonable and an unfair delay causing potential evidential prejudice to the Appellant.

It needed to be remembered that the right of appeal to the Parking Adjudicator can only

be exercised after service of the Notice of Rejection and adjudicators will therefore be

diligent in disallowing enforcement where there is clear evidence of unreasonable delay.

Mr Watts did not dispute the contravention. The issue was the subsequent clamping

Mr Watts asserted that the time taken to release was excessive. In these circumstances

he relied on the ground of appeal in Section 71(4)(e) of the Road Traffic Act 1991 that

‘the [penalty or other] charge in question exceeded the amount applicable in the

The Adjudicator said that the arrangements for payment and release following clamping

are set out in Section 69 (4), which stated: 'a vehicle to which an immobilisation device

has been fixed in accordance with this section shall be released from that device on

payment in any manner specified in the notice affixed of (a) the penalty charge payable;

and (b) such charge in respect of the release as may be required.' Thus the condition

precedent to release of the vehicle was payment of the penalty charge and the release

The question was: is the Council under any duty to release a vehicle promptly once the

The Adjudicator said that section 69 (4) stated that the vehicle was to be released ‘on

payment’. There was no interpretation of the words in the statute and they were to be

construed in the ordinary sense. The meaning was clear and unequivocal, the vehicle

was to be released as soon as payment was made. Therefore, for the Council to argue

that it was under no obligation as regards the time to release was clearly wrong.

The Courts had in previous cases considered similar wording in different situations. In R

v Arkwright [12 QB 970] Denman CJ held that 'on' or ' upon' may mean 'before’,

'simultaneously with' or 'after' according as reason and good sense require, with

reference to the context and subject matter of the enactment. In Paynter v James, [LR 2

CP 398] in the context of a commercial transaction 'payment on delivery' was construed

such as 'on' or ' upon' were used in statutes or contracts, in relation to a duty to act, then

there was incorporated a compulsion to do so in good time. The question of timing was

not left at large or open ended, but must happen within reasonable time, depending on

It would usually not be possible to declamp a vehicle 'simultaneously' with payment,

where payment was made at some distance from the clamped vehicle. The courts had

considered the specific situation of clamping in Arthur v Anker (1996) RTR 308. In that

case, which concerned a private clamping on private land, Bingham MR held that: 'Nor

may the clamper justify detention of the car after the owner has indicated willingness to

comply with the condition for release: the clamper cannot justify any delay in releasing

Where the clamper was a public authority, and the motorist had already paid, the duty to

act was even more pressing. A Council which had exercised the power to clamp under

Section 69 of the Act, was under a duty to act reasonably in relation to the declamp,

which was to happen 'on payment' of the requisite charges. At the very least this meant

using reasonable endeavours to release in good time and following the case of Arthur v

There then followed the question what was ‘within good time' in this context, or what was

The Secretary of State's Guidance on Decriminalised Parking outside London (1992)

stated ' It is important that motorists who have paid their declamping charge and

associated penalty charge should be able to use their vehicle as soon as reasonably

possible. The punishment of wheelclamping should be the cost of the release fee, not

the time and inconvenience in arranging and waiting for the vehicle to be declamped.

Local authorities should therefore set and publish a maximum time for releasing vehicles

Management and Parking Guidance for London', published in February 1998, said 'Local

authorities should set a maximum timescale for releasing vehicles from wheelclamps

once the appropriate charges have been paid. This should be no longer than 4 hours.'

The London Boroughs’ 'Code of Practice' (1995) said that ‘the police aim to declamp

within 4 hours of paying, and authorities should try to get this down to under two hours

on average’. Taking this into account, the Council had fallen below the requirements of

even its own non-statutory guidance, The longest period countenanced in any of these

documents was 4 hours. The Guidance and particularly the Code of Practice were non-

However, the legal requirement for release of vehicles was more stringent than that

envisaged by the guidance or the Boroughs' Code. The Act required that a vehicle be

released 'on payment', and this meant using reasonable endeavours to release in good

time without delay. In those circumstances, any time in excess of 2 hours would, prima

facie, be unreasonable. Each case would turn on its own facts; there might be instances

where much less time than 2 hours would, on the facts of the case, be unreasonable.

For example even perhaps 20 minutes would be excessive where the release vehicle

was present in the same street when payment was made. It would only be in the most

extreme circumstances entirely outside the Council's control that a Council could

On this occasion there was a clear breach of the duty to release in good time: the period

from payment to release was manifestly unreasonable. This breach of duty rendered the

clamp and subsequent release wholly defective. The Council should not be in a position

The Appellant's vehicle was parked in a suspended residents' bay. The sign alerting

motorists to the suspension was a yellow hood over the sign plate. The hood bore the no

waiting symbol and stated 'No Waiting, Loading, Unloading'. The first issue was that the

There was no dispute that he was not loading or unloading. The question was whether

he was 'waiting'. The Appellant had left his vehicle for several days. He contended this

was not 'waiting' which he argued, adopting a definition in the New Oxford English

Dictionary 1998, meant to 'remain parked for a short time at the side of the road'. He

The Adjudicator said that the term 'waiting' in the context of parking control derives from

the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984. Its proper construction was therefore a matter of

construing that Act. In the provisions prescribing what may be included in such orders,

the Act consistently used, and used only, 'wait' and 'waiting': sections 2, 4, 7, 10,

Schedules 1 and 2. They did not use 'parking' at all. If there had been a distinction to be

made as the Appellant contended, it clearly would have been necessary to make it in

these provisions. Significantly, in section 32 'parking place' was defined as 'a place

where vehicles, or vehicles of any class, may wait.' It was clear that under the Act,

waiting and parking were synonymous and that waiting was not limited as the Appellant

argued. Indeed, a moment's thought showed that the distinction was unsustainable. If

waiting were limited to 'a short time', when would it cease to be a short time and thus

cease to be waiting and become parking? It should be noted that whether or not the

The Appellant also contended that there had been a breach of Article 6 of the European

Convention on Human Rights and of Article 1 of the First Protocol to the Convention.

The basis for this contention was that the Road Traffic Act 1991provided (section 66)

that if a penalty charge was paid within 14 days the amount of the charge was to be

reduced by the specified proportion, that being 50%. It was to be noted that the provision

The Adjudicator said that as this was provided for in primary legislation, he had no power

to make a declaration of incompatibility with the Convention under section 4 of the

Human Rights Act 1998. However, he expressed the view that the scheme of allowing a

Article 1 of the First Protocol provided that no one shall be deprived of his possessions

'except in the public interest'; and that 'The preceding provisions shall not, however, in

any way impair the right of the State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to

control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the

payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties'. There was a clear public interest in

providing an incentive to motorists to settle their parking penalties promptly and so

minimise the need for the Council having to pursue enforcement through further action,

ultimately through the County Court. The incentive provided was proportionate. It was

difficult to see what advantage there would be in the provision for the reduced penalty

being removed. Motorists who did not dispute the penalty (far and away the majority)

would have to pay the full penalty; and in all probability many more motorists would

delay payment, since there would be no advantage in paying promptly, thus forcing

Councils either to abandon enforcement of the penalties or incur the expense of taking

The Appellant appealed in relation to 26 Penalty Charge Notices issued by the Council

to a vehicle registration number E367FLH between April and July 2000. The ground of

appeal in all of them was that the Appellant was not the owner at the time of the

There had already been a determination of that issue in an appeal by the Appellant

against a Penalty Charge Notice issued to the vehicle by Barnet Council. In that appeal,

decided on 8 September 2000, the Adjudicator found that the Appellant had sold the

contest the 26 appeals, taking the point that the Barnet decision did not bind it.

The Adjudicator said that where there had been a judicial decision on the very same

issue, he would expect a Council to think very carefully about not accepting that decision

and only not to do so where there were very compelling reasons. A decision by one

Adjudicator, whilst not binding on other Adjudicators, would be regarded by others as

highly persuasive and to be followed in the absence, again, of compelling reasons for

He could see no reason for not doing so in this case. The reasons put forward by the

Council were less than compelling and, in some respects, misconceived. The Council

said it had contacted the supposed buyer of the vehicle and that they had denied doing

so. In fact, the Council had contacted Direct Car Finance with addresses in Maidstone

and Grays. There was no reason for thinking that they had any connection with the

Direct Cars in another place that the Appellant thought was the name of the buyer.

Nor did the Council appear to have grasped that the Volvo vehicle was the vehicle the

Appellant said he part exchanged for E367FLH. The Appellant produced the registration

document for that vehicle showing he became the keeper on 7 October 1999. Since the

transaction. This gave the other party as P & A Cars. The Adjudicator drew no adverse

inference from the difference in the name. Had the Appellant fabricated a document to

back up his story, it was unlikely he would have produced one with a different name. He

inferred that the explanation was the innocent one that the Appellant's memory was

faulty, or that the other party employed more than one name. The fact that the document

was not signed was not crucial, nor did the fact that it bore two dates. It was clear that

the first was when the deal was arranged, the second when the sum of £230 was paid in

These cases were heard together. In each the alleged contravention was being in a bus

lane during prescribed hours. Both appellants admitted being in the bus lane but said

that the infringement was accidental. They said they did not see the signs for the bus

The issue was whether the Council had complied with its duty under regulation 18 of the

Local Authorities’ Traffic Orders (Procedures) (England & Wales) Regulations 1996 to

One of the signs in question was a Non-Primary Route Directional Sign (NPRDS). It

transpired that the Council changed this sign on its own initiative on 12 December 2000.

The Council produced in evidence an authorisation by the Secretary of State for the

Environment, Transport and the Regions dated 7 January 2000. This was given under

Sections 64 and 65 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 and ‘all other powers

enabling him’, and authorised the signing scheme for the bus and tram lanes and routes

The adequacy or otherwise of the old NPRDS was central to the appeals. The Council

contended that the indication given by the NPRDS was correct and adequate at the point

it was given. It said that whilst it had replaced the sign, it had not done so because it

The first point was whether the NPRDS complied with the Traffic Signs Regulations and

State’s authorisation, so to be lawful it had to comply with the TSRGD. The Adjudicator

said it was clear it did not. It was variant 31 to Schedule 16 that permitted diagrams 953

(route for use by buses and pedal cycles only) and 953.1 (route for use by tramcars

only) to be incorporated in the NPRDS. However, the variant said ‘953 (with 953.2) or

953.1 (with 953.2)’. Diagram 953.2 was a plate bearing the word ‘Only’. The words in

brackets – ‘(with 953.2)’ – were mandatory, not optional. The most natural reading was

that it was required in every case. The Adjudicator was strengthened in this view by the

combination with diagram 953.2. That being so, it was difficult to see why the inclusion of

meant, respectively, buses and pedal cycles and trams only. There could be no logical

reason for their sometimes being accompanied by the ‘Only’ plate and sometimes not.

The old NPRDS therefore did not comply with the TSRGD. Even if it did, it would in any

event not be adequate. The combination of 953 and 953.1 with ‘local access only’

meant: buses, pedal cycles and trams only and local access. This was manifestly self-

contradictory. Had the Council realised the need to include 953.2 with 953 and 953.1 this

contradiction. But the unsatisfactory nature of the sign went further. The message the

sign was likely to plant in the motorist’s mind was an unqualified invitation to proceed up

the slip road. On entering the slip road, the motorist had to use the outside lane since

the inside lane was a tram track. Having proceeded a little way up the slip road, the

motorist was then faced with a situation in which the unqualified invitation issued by the

NPRDS was rescinded: the motorist was then directed to turn left into Walpole Road.

This was on the face of it a startling proposition, involving as it did turning from the

outside lane sharp left across the inside lane, directly across the path of traffic

approaching from behind along the inside lane - a potentially extremely hazardous

manoeuvre. To ordinary careful motorists this was an extraordinary manoeuvre against

which they would instinctively recoil. The fact therefore that the NPRDS apparently

issued an unqualified invitation to proceed up the slip road was in the context especially

critical. It had to be remembered that the motorist had to rapidly take in and digest the

message given by the signs whilst on the move, and it was crucial that the signs should

be prominent, clear and unambiguous. The fact that the Council changed the NPRDS on

its own initiative showed that it considered it could be improved upon. The Adjudicator

Whilst the decision on the old NPRDS rendered the signage as a whole inadequate and

was sufficient to decide the appeals, the Adjudicator dealt with certain general points

Secretary of State obviously would not authorise signing unless he believed it to

reconsider the signage if practical experience suggested there were difficulties.

authorisation from the Secretary of State was exempt from judicial scrutiny. The

2. The Council drew a distinction between what it described as ‘enforceable’ and

‘advisory’ signs. It appeared to suggest that for some reason defects in the latter

could not render the signage inadequate. By ‘enforceable’ the Adjudicator took it

to be referring to Section 36 of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 under which

it was a criminal offence to fail to obey certain signs, as opposed to contravening

the traffic restrictions themselves. Under regulation 18 of the Local Authorities’

enforceable under Section 36, but in considering the adequacy of the information

3. It appeared that the Council and the Department of Environment, Transport and

general traffic in an adjoining traffic lane’. The Adjudicator could not see that this

and was therefore not for ‘general traffic’. The underpass was not adjoining: it

conveyed to motorists, both to avoid their unwittingly going up the bus lane and,

These cases raised various issues as to the operation and legality of the parking

restrictions in force in the streets surrounding the Arsenal football stadium at Highbury.

The Adjudicator identified five Traffic Management Orders imposing restrictions in the

area. He said that they amounted to an extraordinarily complex set of regulations for

such a small area. Different restrictions applied to different streets, different parts of

streets, different vehicles at different times. In addition many of them came and went

depending on the fixture list of the local football club, and, in the case of the Islington

(Arsenal Event Days)(Waiting Restrictions) Experimental Traffic Order 1999, the state of

the traffic. And if that were not enough the Experimental Order applied on top of the pre-

existing restrictions, if any. When considering whether or not contraventions have

occurred the Council was entitled to have the validity and operation of each type of

restriction considered individually on its merits. However in considering whether each

restriction was clearly and correctly indicated to the motoring public the context should

be taken into account. A plate that might give perfectly clear information taken on its own

might cease to be so clear if it was surrounded by others giving confusing information.

Given that there were so many types of restriction in this area he approached these

cases on the basis that the Council had to demonstrate with particular clarity that the

various restrictions relied on, which had proved unfathomable to a number of Appellants,

He then went on to consider the two Orders particularly in issue, first the Islington

(Gillespie Traffic Scheme)(Parking Places) Order 1997. The scheme of this Order was

that on ‘match days’ during controlled hours (8am-midnight) any vehicle left in a

designated parking place in any of the affected streets was required to display a permit.

Match days were defined to include not just football matches but any activity which in the

opinion of the Commissioner of Police after consultation with Islington Council’s

Assistant Director (Development) Technical and Environmental Services was likely to

benefit from the scheme being in operation. The restrictions were signed by a number of

different signs that did not comply with the Traffic Signs Regulations and General

Directions 1994. Furthermore, the signs did not correctly indicate the restrictions since

they stated they applied on match days, when the restrictions applied only from 8am to

The relevant statutory provisions were the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 sections 64

and 65 and the Local Authorities’ Traffic Orders (Procedure) (England and Wales)

Regulations 1996, Reg.18. The latter regulation did not give the Council an unrestricted

discretion in signing restrictions: the provision, contained as it was in regulations, did not

Regulation Act 1984 and was in any event subject to the Council’s duty as a public

First the Order was fundamentally defective in that the prescribed hours were not

prescribed at all. Although it might just be acceptable for the commencement time to be

set according to another reasonably ascertainable event (the advertised starting time)

unenforceable. The order stated ‘until normal traffic operation can be resumed’. What

was ‘normal traffic operation’? How was it to be ascertained? In whose opinion? As it

stood, the finishing time could not be ascertained. It followed that it was impossible to

say with certainty whether or not at any given time a motorist was parked within the

Secondly even if the order were enforceable the Council was under a duty to give

reasonable notice if it wished to enforce against those motorists whose vehicles were

already in position before the restriction kicked in. There was no reason why at least 24

hours notice should not be given, or at least notice to the effect that on event days

Finally, the signs referred to ‘match days’, not the wider definition in the Orders. Even

taking ‘match day’ as referring only to football it was not clear how the motorist was to

inform himself with confidence at the time of parking. As a matter of principle it was for

the Council to ensure that the days and times when parking was not permitted were

notified to the motorist with clarity and precision. In the case of upcoming restrictions it

was for the Council to identify and display in advance at least the next day when the

restrictions were due to bite. If the Council was unable to do this, it could hardly expect

The Adjudicator said that these appeals raised, not for the first time, the question of

whether a vehicle (normally as in this case a motorcycle or motor scooter) commited a

contravention by parking on pavement lights or other areas on the side of the street

The alleged contravention was that the vehicle was parked with one or more of its

wheels on any part of an ‘urban road other than a carriageway,’ contrary to section15 (1)

The area concerned was clearly not carriageway. The question was whether it was part

of an ‘urban road’. ‘Urban road’ was defined, put simply, as a road subject to a speed

limit. ‘Road’ was defined in s 142 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 as ‘any length

A highway was ‘a route which all persons rich or poor can use to pass and repass along

as often and whenever they wish without let or hindrance and without charge’. (Orlik, An

The Adjudicator said that the point was whether the highway extended right up to

adjoining buildings. In considering this he was, he said, assisted by Adjudicators’ views

in a number of very similar cases, which he regarded as highly persuasive. He said that

much depended on the nature and ‘look and feel’ of the area in question. He shared the

broad view of other Adjudicators in similar cases that where there were no physical

barriers and the public apparently had been free to walk over the whole width of the

Even if the area was not part of the highway it might still be a ‘length of road to which the

public has access’. The leading case was Harrison v Hill 1932 J.C.13 where Lord Sands

‘In my view, access means, not right of access, but ingress in fact without any physical

And later, ‘In my view, any road may be regarded as a road to which the public have

access either by overcoming a physical obstruction or in defiance of a prohibition

‘It is plain, from the terms of the definition, that the class of road intended is wider than

the class of public roads to which the public has access in virtue of a positive right

belonging to the public, and flowing either from statute or from prescriptive user.’

The question was whether in fact the public went there and whether there was any

He found that the area in question was either a part of the highway or a length of road to