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Logic Law
Fighting illegal motorist parking tickets,
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Bernini - The Ecstasy of St. Teresa

Welcome to Gary Powell's site main site link click here.
The LGO watcher forum is here......
more is here...

The latest 'managed' survey that is being put up ....
Purley, 13 February 2008.

SURVEY PUBLISHED

The long-awaited LGO Ipsos MORI Customer Satisfaction Survey has now been published on the LGO website, and can be read at

http://www.lgo.org.uk/pdf/Cust_sat_report_2007.pdf

Please do not reply to this e-mail, or write to LGOWatch, with any comment; there is a discussion thread on the LGO Forum , and any comment or analysis should be posted there. I am sure new contributors to the Forum discussion will be most welcome.

The Survey contains a lot of information, and people in the LGOWatch community have been analysing and discussing the way the survey was carried out for some time. In the previous MORI survey (1999), the LGO were allowed to exclude 12% of the original sample for spurious reasons, and apparently with no independent verification that the complainants were not being excluded for the sole reason that the LGO knew them to be dissatisfied.

In the 2007 survey, even more people were excluded by the LGO from the original Ipsos MORI sample, and there again does not seem to have been a process to verify the exclusions were not simply a way of falsely increasing LGO satisfaction ratings.

Despite having removed so many complainants from the original sample, apparently at their absolute discretion, the survey is still damning of the LGO's office. For instance, 50% of complainants interviewed were dissatisfied with the fairness of the investigation. One wonders how much worse the statistics would have been if the LGO had not been allowed to remove so many of the original sample.

I hope there might be a further Ebulletin on the Survey at some point soon, as well as a News Release. Many thanks to the colleagues who have worked so hard on this project so far.

You can read about the 1999 MORI Survey on the LGOWatch website.

PETITION

If you have already signed Trevor's petition on the Government's E-petitions website, then many thanks. If you have not, may I invite you to do so? It is at

http://petitions.pm.gov.uk/ombudsmen/

and is calling for the setting up of an Appeal Tribunal to review the decisions of the Public Service Ombudsmen, including the LGO.

The petition runs until 13 June 2008. Please consider forwarding it to friends and relatives who might also consider signing, which can be done by clicking on the 'forward e-mail' link below.

UNSUBSCRIBE?

If you do not wish to receive any more Ebulletins from LGOWatch, please click on the 'SafeUnsubscribe' link below.

Best wishes,

Gary Powell

Local Government Ombudsman Watch

Logic

Welcome to Gary Powell's site main site link click here.

Local Government Ombudsman Watch
The LGO watcher forum is here......
The latest survey poll on the LGO
now called the PUBLIC SERVICE ombudsman, all the renaming is to strengthen what is too weak.

Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?

Law

Essential Logic

Motorist

Classic Fallacies

Challenges

RTA Schedule 6

Conduct Fallacies

RTA / CPR 75.3

Injustice Pages provided by other people.

Victories

News Items

Case law

Illegal Procedures

Bill of Rights

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The book on disambiguation

A citizens' toolbox for everyday. DIY disambiguation of spin, casuistry, sophistry, and malfeasant mindlessness. A selection from over one hundred topics in the forthcoming book.

___________________________________________________________________

0. Theoretical considerations, in a treatise on critical thinking.

1. The laws of thought, Theory of flux.

2. Natural cause and final cause reasoning; where the boundaries meet, and how the breaches of final cause reasoning lead to Machiavellian ethics.

3. Bureaucracy and template systems, that fail in correspondence with facts, and the lack of will and templates that admit faults, leading to the detriment in the integrity of mental health.

4. Blurred distinctions in B. Russell's “On Denoting”, and Wittgenstein's Notes, leading to erroneous formulations in wholly determinate senses, Frege's merit vindicated.

5. Relevant extracts from Carl Jung's 'Structure and dynamics of the Psyche', showing where conscience is the natural fulcrum regulating the conscious and sub-conscious.

6. A practical guide going behind the faces of deception.

7. Principles of Instinct, psychic function, heuristics, and autonomous thinking.

8. Opposites, and or Contradictions, a substantial difference.

9. Outlines of design and purpose revealing the inner will of directing minds.

10. Six essential rules and two axioms of validity.

11. Over twenty rules for disambiguation of sophistry.

12. Causal and Final Reasoning, the fallacious boundary of malevolence.

13. Observing the stream of consciousness, and disambiguating the 'forked tongue' syndrome.

14. Scientific methodology, principles of necessary and sufficient reasoning.

15. Forty plus common fallacies, and the infinite variety of correspondence theory breach.

16. Divergent and convergent thinking in legal drafting.

17. How some fallacious rulings in exception determinations are self confuting.

18. The art of “suppressio veri”, “suggestio falsi.”

19. Knowing and believing, showing and deceiving.

20. How to swear a truthful lie, and to determine how many layers of ambiguity.

21. Disambiguating the sentential parts into propositional forms.

22. Truth table matrices in the calculus of logic, and probability theory.

23. Critique of foundation errors in Russell's 'On Denoting' and Wittgenstein's notes

24. How and where keywords indicating the subconscious truth are determined with clarity.

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Traversals 1

The PCNs

1. All PCN's below and prior to August 10^th when Camden may have altered their formulation to correct the description of being 'unenforceable nullities' Main / extract.

2. Two Date issue. J. Jackson High Court 2^nd Aug 06 P35 and P5 - d)

3. Should NOT have been enforced. ALG Newsletter P52 and P6 –e)

4. Hyams v Camden Specific Ruling P69 and P6 - f)

5. 'Mistake of Fact / Law' , Statute of Limitations. P49 and P6 - g)

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Traversals 1 (this section is being updated as at Nov 2007).

1. The 'FORUM' Argument (irrelevant in this hearing).

• Usually used to take the challenge away from the ambit of a Court, and either back to TEC or PATAS preferably PATAS where rulings have a characteristic of being softer on councils, trivialising their breaches and upholding strict compliance for trivia against the motorist.

• If your case is one for restitution this section is far more complex and can take a day's hearing in time. It involves significant case law references for the argument that the local county court can hear cases ruled in the high court. And there are a few new arguments that are untenable against a 'reductio ad absurdum' test, ones that have come up in a recent hearing, that are rebutted also, it is the level 2 bundle for people prepared to take their case even tot eh high court where necessary, and you will need to be well equipped to argue, preferable with a barrister, or very very good McKenzie friend.

• Looking for evidence or grounds on this? The defendant can show two letters from Camden that show perfect equivocation. One making it clear that an adjudicator's ruling is binding in a court of law, the other stating that an adjudicator's ruling does not set a precedent. Except they don't say which way. Usually and in the majority of cases, an adjudicator's ruling that is prejudicial and biased eventually becomes overruled by a ruling, where the appellant has argued thoroughly, and the earlier prejudicial one is rejected, not the other way around. The Bill of Rights argument has been impliedly repealed, not expressly, prejudicially backwards to enable a penal system to be removed from its origins in the Crown prerogative; to prevent 'mischief' (the term the DVLA uses), and conferred upon councils restoring the very mischief that was deplored when Parliament bridled it. Simple scientific methodology in nomic relationships and causes in necessary and sufficient conditions. This has now become well established and criticised benignly since there is a benefit obviously helpful to central funding. Such a system undermines the integrity at PATAS and delivers want of confidence in the public, because they are unaccountable. An appellant can go to a hearing, play Russian Roulette, with a knowing adjudicator dismissing his appeal, simply because of the asymmetry of knowledge, where his chamber was empty at the trigger, or he failed to play the right card. This is egregiously invidious and smacks of a Hippocritic oath rather then a Hippocratic one. A lawyer would not expect his doctor to behave in such a manner when amputating a leg. But this whole argument dis-applies here, having traversed the entire procedural progress to the court, as the final impartial arbiter.

2. The 'TWO' date argument (thoroughly treated here special focus on Camden)

   • RTA 1991 section 66,

   • Al's V Bar,

   • Barnet V Moses - High Court,

   • Restitution Case precedent Southend on Sea,

   • ALG 14th Aug 2006 newsletter,

   • ALG review 2005-6,

   • Moulder V Sutton,

   • Hyams V Camden, and

   • Simple pure logic, one cannot possibly extrapolate TWO different dates, from one date referred to in several senses - the first day of 2007, the first day of the first month in 2007, the 1^st January 2007, Monday 1st January 2007 do not permit the possibility of any option of a sense of the next day 2nd January 2007. Justice Jackson states, certainty is required, and one date does not satisfy that condition. The 28 days payment within or from is affected as below following from no date whatsoever.

3. There is a series of inconstancies and contrarieties at PATAS, showing the two date issue being ruled in accordance with the Justice Jackson Hearing. Many are upheld at appeal in favour of the motorist who appeared in person, with one exception. Trade team V Camden, wher a short list were dismissed without reason, and it is understood that Trade team did not appeal in person, being a larger company who could afford to disregard these costs, no doubt their being built in to sales.

   • This short-list of about six, against many more to the contrary indicated what in the obverse case would look highly likely to be venal conduct. Consider: A large number of motorists have their appeals dismissed, and Trade team; singularly, has theirs upheld. One would be likely to consider that Trade team was taking care to ensure there rulings were favourable, saving them revenue. Returning to the original 'reversed back', Trade-team's dismissals enable two things for Camden, 1- Camden gain the revenue in some cases, AND 2 – Camden can argue with truth, with implied falsity that rulings against their two date non complain PCNs continue to be in their favour. The choreography, single name dismissal, and pecuniary advantages look remarkably biased.

4. The 'YOU' Argument

• A PCN using 'YOU' instead of the impersonal 'IT', is flawed, and non compliant, it has to refer strictly to the impersonal sense as in RTA 1991, section 66. Any person may be reading the PCN, it is aimed at the registered keeper, if a PCN, and at the OWNER if a NTO. Therefore You must pay, fails to direct liability to the owner, who may be the driver, keeper and owner, BUT they may also be three different people.

• These are argued and ruled on at PATAS in the following cases;

  • Macarthur –v- Bury Metropolitan Council, PATAS Case BC188.

  • Aspire Loft –v- London Borough of Camden PATAS Case 2070172175.

  • Al's Bar –v- LB Wandsworth PATAS Case 2020106430.

  • Aldridge –v- City of Westminster PATAS Case 2050479095, last para.

• From PATAS Review 2002; Therefore, the person who receives the Penalty Charge Notice may or may not be the person legally liable to pay the penalty charge. It is no doubt for this reason that the draftsman chose the impersonal 'that the penalty charge must be paid' Al's Bar V Wandsworth V Al's Bar, For the notice to say 'You are required to pay' will be an inaccurate statement of the legal position in a great many cases. In those circumstances, it cannot to my mind be said that the formulation in the PCN constitutes substantial compliance. The point here is that the adjudicator states clearly that 'you' does not constitute substantial compliance.

• On page 12 of the PATAS review 2002. to repeat the entire relevant section;

  Did the PCN comply with section 66(3) (c), (d) and (e)?The Adjudicator said that substantial compliance would be sufficient; literal compliance was not essential. (see the next section) “However, this should not be thought of as encouraging enthusiastic departure from the statutory language. Disciplined drafting dictated that where a statute required a document to contain particular statements, the starting point for drafting a compliant document ought always be that the statutory language should be carried across to the document unless there were very good reasons for doing otherwise. This was for the very obvious reason that using the statutory language eliminated the opportunities for challenging the document for non-compliance. The statutory requirements took precedence over the commendable aim of couching documents in plain English. Local Authorities must be aware that the language they used, however plain, must bear the same meaning in substance as that prescribed by the statute. As to paragraph (c), the PCN said: 'You are therefore required to pay the sum of £80 within 28 days.' This did not comply with paragraph (c) because: • The parking attendant effects service of the PCN by either fixing it to the vehicle or giving it to 'the person appearing to him to be in charge of the vehicle'. Under section 66(2) the person legally liable for payment of a penalty charge is the owner. It may or may not be that the person in charge of the vehicle is the owner. Therefore, the person who receives the PCN may or may not be the person legally liable to pay the penalty charge. For the notice to say 'You are required to pay' would be an inaccurate statement of the legal position in a great many cases. • The prescribed period for payment is 'before the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the date of the notice'. The PCN said 'within 28 days'. “

• The 'SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE' internal contradiction and biased thinking argument.

  To say “that substantial compliance would be sufficient; literal compliance was not essential” is materially equivalent to “IN-substantial NON-compliance is sufficient”

  • I trust this material equivalence each side of the equation is abundantly clear, and conforms to the requirements of mathematical and logical precision.

  • It follows from this rule that if a council may be treated flexibly in its “IN-substantial NON-compliances”. THEN the motorist must expect; for the scales of Justice to be equally balanced, AND every person is equal under the law, that all motorists whose contraventions are insubstantial and trivial in non compliance MUST be treated with the same rule, and PCN's issued in a substantial number of cases for seconds and a few minutes are in direct proportion with the substantial number of cases a council is IN-substantial in its NON-compliance.

  • If PATAS invariably rules against a motorist for trivial contraventions and NOT against the council for the materially identical fault then PATAS is displaying bias, and venal conduct ruling unjustly. PATAS rules literally against motorists, and non literally for councils.

• FURTHERMORE;

The '28 days” argument.

• Usually documentation like the PCN, NTO, NOR, CC and PATAS letters say “you must pay within or from, 28 days”; also “28 days from the date of this letter,” (non compliant). These must refer to a date of notice / issue, and must state date of service of this letter.

• Additional certainty is added to the cascade effect of 'pay within 14 / 28 days' where the date of Notice / Issue, is absent, and only a date of contravention present, then the 28 days follows from no date whatsoever.

• There is a further point on this second element. In order to calculate the period, it is necessary to know 'the date of the notice'. Implicitly, therefore, paragraph (c) requires the notice to bear its date. The date '20/11/01' appears twice on the PCN. It appears about halfway down where it is stated that the vehicle 'was seen in Lockington Road SW8 at 09:24 on 20/11/01'. That is in fact part of the 'grounds on which the parking attendant believes that a penalty charge is payable with respect to the vehicle' required by paragraph (a).

• PATAS review 2002 para 12. (c), the PCN said: 'You are therefore required to pay the sum of £80 within 28 days.' This did not comply with paragraph (c) because: • The parking attendant effects service of the PCN by either fixing it to the vehicle or giving it to 'the person appearing to him to be in charge of the vehicle'. Under section 66(2) the person legally liable for payment of a penalty charge is the owner. It may or may not be that the person in charge of the vehicle is the owner. Therefore, the person who receives the PCN may or may not be the person legally liable to pay the penalty charge. For the notice to say 'You are required to pay' would be an inaccurate statement of the legal position in a great many cases. • The prescribed period for payment is 'before the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the date of the notice'. The PCN said 'within 28 days'.

• Amongst the many documents submitted to me by Mr Sutton was a copy of the judgement of his case against the London Boro' of Camden in the Central London County Court. District Judge Wigfield handed down the judgement and pages 19 to 28 are the relevant pages. The local authority has a copy of this judgement. The points to which the Judge refers in those pages are exactly the same as Mr Sutton raised in this appeal and are all concerned with the fact that a Penalty Charge Notice MUST state what is set out in Sec 66(3)(a)-(f) inclusive of the Road Traffic Act 1991.In particular, in this case, the PCN does not state that the penalty must be paid within 28 day period. Word MUST is mandatory.; PCN also does not state that this period should begin with the date of the notice; also, no date of notice stated as such. PCN does not state that penalty must be paid within 14 period to begin with the date of the notice-date of issue and date of notice may not be the same. PCN also fails to refer to "before the end of the 28 day period" see sec 66(3)(e) RTA 1991 or to refer to the NTO being served by the "London authority on the person appearing to them to be the owner of the vehicle." All these matters are traversed in some detail by Judge Wigfield and I incorporate pages 19-28 of his judgement into my adjudication as they are entirely to the point. I would also draw attention to the Judge's reference to the case of Moulder v Sutton London Boro Council at page 26 as it also deals with similar issues as arise in this case. .......the law is clear. It follows that I allow this appeal.

Comment: What follows is uncertainty to the point of absurdity. Just look at the document, every 27^th day and read that you must pay within 28 days, another 28 days, recurring endlessly?

• Time limit for service of a Notice to Owner, NTO.

• PATAS review 2002, page 8. A Local Authority is not entitled to pursue enforcement where the Notice to Owner is not served within the statutory time limit.

• The Adjudicator referred to Lord Hailsham's comment in London & Clydesdale that 'I do not think we are entitled to play fast and loose with statutory requirements designed to inform the subject as to his legal rights against an authority possessed of compulsory powers.

• The time limit for service of a NTO is six months.

5. ALG Recommendations: Members are recommended to

   • ensure that their boroughs have:

   • stopped issuing non-compliant PCNs

   • revised the format of their PCNs to ensure that they do comply with the relevant decisions

   • stopped processing any non-compliant PCNs *****

6. The PCN does not comply with the RTA 1991, and cannot be enforced.

7. As a 'Mistake of Fact / Law' , and under the Statute of Limitations. Non Compliant PCNs are order to be refunded with interest at 8%.

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The Road Traffic Act 1991, Section 66,

The Road Traffic Act 1991, Parts.

Parking penalties in London.

Section

66.—(1) Where, in the case of a stationary vehicle in a designated parking place, a parking attendant has reason to believe that a penalty charge is payable with respect to the vehicle, he may—

(a) fix a penalty charge notice to the vehicle; or

(b) give such a notice to the person appearing to him to be in charge of the vehicle.

(2) For the purposes of this Part of this Act, a penalty charge is payable with respect to a vehicle, by the owner of the vehicle, if—

(a) the vehicle has been left—

(i) otherwise than as authorised by or under any order relating to the designated parking place; or

(ii) beyond the period of parking which has been paid for;

(b) no parking charge payable with respect to the vehicle has been paid; or

(c) there has, with respect to the vehicle, been a contravention of, or failure to comply with, any provision made by or under any order relating to the designated parking place.

(3) A penalty charge notice must state—

(a) the grounds on which the parking attendant believes that a penalty charge is payable with respect to the vehicle;

(b) the amount of the penalty charge which is payable;

(c) that the penalty charge must be paid before the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the date of the notice;

(d) that if the penalty charge is paid before the end of the period of 14 days beginning with the date of the notice, the amount of the penalty charge will be reduced by the specified proportion;

(e) that, if the penalty charge is not paid before the end of the 28 day period, a notice to owner may be served by the London authority on the person appearing to them to be the owner of the vehicle;

(f) the address to which payment of the penalty charge must be sent.

(4) In subsection (3)(d) above "specified proportion" means such proportion, applicable to all cases, as may be determined by the London authorities acting through the Joint Committee.

(5) A penalty charge notice fixed to a vehicle in accordance with this section shall not be removed or interfered with except by or under the authority of—

(a) the owner, or person in charge, of the vehicle; or

(b) the London authority for the place in which the vehicle in question was found.

(6) A person contravening subsection (5) above shall be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 2 on the standard scale.

(7) Schedule 6 to this Act shall have effect with respect to penalty charges, notices to owners and other matters supplementing the provisions of this section.

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The Road Traffic Act 1991, Section 44,

The Road Traffic Act 1991, Parts.

Parking penalties in London.

Parking attendants.

Section

44.—(1) After section 63 of the [1984 c. 27.] Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984, there shall be inserted—

Parking attendants.

63A. — (1) A local authority may provide for the supervision of parking places within their area by individuals to be known as parking attendants.

(2) Parking attendants shall also have such other functions in relation to stationary vehicles as may be conferred by or under any other enactment.

(3) A parking attendant shall be—

(a) an individual employed by the authority; or

(b) where the authority have made arrangements with any person for the purposes of this section, an individual employed by that person to act as a parking attendant.

(4) Parking attendants in Greater London shall wear such uniform as the Secretary of State may determine when exercising prescribed functions, and shall not exercise any of those functions when not in uniform. (comment; NO HAT on, is a breach).

(5) In this section "local authority" and "parking place" have the meanings given by section 32(4) of this Act.

"

(2) In section 35 of that Act (provisions as to use of parking places provided under section 32 or 33), subsection (9) shall be omitted.

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The Road Traffic Act 1991, SCHEDULE 6,

Breaches here, breach your human rights to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time. Councils are skipping procedure in malfeasance and issuing charge certificates, either while an appeal is pending, or skipping it completely where they can serve a charge and rely on the ignorance of the motorist knowing his fundamental human rights EU convention Protocol 5 Article 6. This is deplorable unacceptable conduct and needs to be bridled urgently before a wholesale breach of presumption of guilt and appeals process is demolished and it becomes acceptable as reasonable within a so called democracy.

The Road Traffic Act 1991, Parts.

Parking penalties in London.

SCHEDULE 6 Parking Penalties

The notice to owner        1.—(1) Where—

 (a) a penalty charge notice has been issued with respect to a vehicle under section 66 of this Act; and

 (b) the period of 28 days for payment of the penalty charge has expired without that charge being paid,

the London authority concerned may serve a notice ("a notice to owner") on the person who appears to them to have been the owner of the vehicle when the alleged contravention occurred.

    (2) A notice to owner must state—

 (a) the amount of the penalty charge payable;

 (b) the grounds on which the parking attendant who issued the penalty charge notice believed that a penalty charge was payable with respect to the vehicle;

 (c) that the penalty charge must be paid before the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the date on which the notice to owner is served;

 (d) that failure to pay the penalty charge may lead to an increased charge being payable;

 (e) the amount of that increased charge;

 (f) that the person on whom the notice is served ("the recipient") may be entitled to make representations under paragraph 2 below; and

 (g) the effect of paragraph 5 below.

    (3) The Secretary of State may prescribe additional matters which must be dealt with in any notice to owner.

Representations against notice to owner        2.—(1) Where it appears to the recipient that one or other of the grounds mentioned in sub-paragraph (4) below are satisfied, he may make representations to that effect to the London authority who served the notice on him.

    (2) Any representations under this paragraph must be made in such form as may be specified by the London authorities, acting through the Joint Committee.

    (3) The authority may disregard any such representations which are received by them after the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the date on which the notice to owner was served.

    (4) The grounds are— (do not accept this as limiting the grounds, the most covering one is (f) below that can be used for any PCN where you feel the amount is not owed at all, this covers such contentions).

 (a) that the recipient—

 (i) never was the owner of the vehicle in question;

 (ii) had ceased to be its owner before the date on which the alleged contravention occurred; or

 (iii) became its owner after that date;

 (b) that the alleged contravention did not occur;

 (c) that the vehicle had been permitted to remain at rest in the parking place by a person who was in control of the vehicle without the consent of the owner;

 (d) that the relevant designation order is invalid;

 (e) that the recipient is a vehicle-hire firm and—

 (i) the vehicle in question was at the material time hired from that firm under a vehicle hiring agreement; and

 (ii) the person hiring it had signed a statement of liability acknowledging his liability in respect of any penalty charge notice fixed to the vehicle during the currency of the hiring agreement;

 (f) that the penalty charge exceeded the amount applicable in the circumstances of the case.

    (5) Where the ground mentioned in sub-paragraph (4)(a)(ii) above is relied on in any representations made under this paragraph, those representations must include a statement of the name and address of the person to whom the vehicle was disposed of by the person making the representations (if that information is in his possession).

    (6) Where the ground mentioned in sub-paragraph (4)(a)(iii) above is relied on in any representations made under this paragraph, those representations must include a statement of the name and address of the person from whom the vehicle was acquired by the person making the representations (if that information is in his possession).

    (7) It shall be the duty of an authority to whom representations are duly made under this paragraph—

 (a) to consider them and any supporting evidence which the person making them provides; and

 (b) to serve on that person notice of their decision as to whether they accept that the ground in question has been established. ( Failures here are legion and excused as software / postal faults that are council faults - 2007)

Cancellation of notice to owner        3.—(1) Where representations are made under paragraph 2 above and the London authority concerned accept that the ground in question has been established they shall—

 (a) cancel the notice to owner; and

 (b) state in the notice served under paragraph 2(7) above that the notice to owner has been cancelled.

    (2) The cancellation of a notice to owner under this paragraph shall not be taken to prevent the London authority concerned serving a fresh notice to owner on another person.

    (3) Where the ground that is accepted is that mentioned in paragraph 2(4)(e) above, the person hiring the vehicle shall be deemed to be its owner for the purposes of this Schedule.

Rejection of representations against notice to owner        

4.    Where any representations are made under paragraph 2 above but the London authority concerned do not accept that a ground has been established, the notice served under paragraph 2(7) above ("the notice of rejection") must—

 (a) state that a charge certificate may be served under paragraph 6 below unless before the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the date of service of the notice of rejection—

 (i) the penalty charge is paid; or

 (ii) the person on whom the notice is served appeals to a parking adjudicator against the penalty charge;

 (b) indicate the nature of a parking adjudicator's power to award costs against any person appealing to him; and

 (c) describe in general terms the form and manner in which an appeal to a parking adjudicator must be made,

and may contain such other information as the authority consider appropriate.

Adjudication by parking adjudicator        

5.—(1) Where an authority serve notice under sub-paragraph (7) of paragraph 2 above, that they do not accept that a ground on which representations were made under that paragraph has been established, the person making those representations may, before—

 (a) the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the date of service of that notice; or

 (b) such longer period as a parking adjudicator may allow,

appeal to a parking adjudicator against the authority's decision.

This part is deplorable. Camden Council has a duty to serve with the notice of rejection an appeal form to appeal to the parking adjudicator. Where they fail to do either or both, then there is conveniently for them, NO WAY you can appeal. This is used to bully people into submission, and plays on the postal delinquency. Ask insistently for the notice or rejection and appeal form, in writing, recorded until you get it, it is the ambit where Camden Council controls your human rights to an appeal.

THE SAME malfeasance occurs at CPR 75. 3, and you find bailiff visits out of the blue, askign for more money without real visits to substantiate their work.

    (2) On an appeal under this paragraph, the parking adjudicator shall consider the representations in question and any additional representations which are made by the appellant on any of the grounds mentioned in paragraph 2(4) above and may give the London authority concerned such directions as he considers appropriate.

    (3) It shall be the duty of any authority to whom a direction is given under sub-paragraph (2) above to comply with it forthwith.

Charge certificates        6.—(1) Where a notice to owner is served on any person and the penalty charge to which it relates is not paid before the end of the relevant period, the authority serving the notice may serve on that person a statement (a "charge certificate") to the effect that the penalty charge in question is increased by 50 per cent.

    (2) The relevant period, in relation to a notice to owner, is the period of 28 days beginning—

 (a) where no representations are made under paragraph 2 above, with the date on which the notice to owner is served;

 (b) where—

 (i) such representations are made;

 (ii) a notice of rejection is served by the authority concerned; and

 (iii) no appeal against the notice of rejection is made,

with the date on which the notice of rejection is served; or

 (c) where there has been an unsuccessful appeal against a notice of rejection, with the date on which notice of the adjudicator's decision is served on the appellant.

    (3) Where an appeal against a notice of rejection is made but is withdrawn before the adjudicator gives notice of his decision, the relevant period in relation to a notice to owner is the period of 14 days beginning with the date on which the appeal is withdrawn.

Enforcement of charge certificate        7.    Where a charge certificate has been served on any person and the increased penalty charge provided for in the certificate is not paid before the end of the period of 14 days beginning with the date on which the certificate is served, the authority concerned may, if a county court so orders, recover the increased charge as if it were payable under a county court order.

Invalid notices        8.—(1) This paragraph applies where—

 (a) a county court makes an order under paragraph 7 above;

 (b) the person against whom it is made makes a statutory declaration complying with sub-paragraph (2) below; and

 (c) that declaration is, before the end of the period of 21 days beginning with the date on which notice of the county court's order is served on him, served on the county court which made the order.

    (2) The statutory declaration must state that the person making it—

 (a) did not receive the notice to owner in question;

 (b) made representations to the London authority concerned under paragraph 2 above but did not receive a rejection notice from that authority; or

 (c) appealed to a parking adjudicator under paragraph 5 above against the rejection by that authority of representations made by him under paragraph 2 above but had no response to the appeal.

    (3) Sub-paragraph (4) below applies where it appears to a district judge, on the application of a person on whom a charge certificate has been served, that it would be unreasonable in the circumstances of his case